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Introduction
In recent years, there has been an increase in the number of laws requiring organizations to make
information available and simultaneously maintain confidentiality if the release of such information might
violate individual or group rights to privacy. This is compounded by the issue of ethics; while the release of
some potentially sensitive data may not be strictly illegal, it may not be behaviorally justifiable. For
example, while it is not illegal to view employee electronic messages produced and stored on companyowned systems, invasion of privacy questions arise (Schultheis and Sumner, 1995).
Recently, in an effort to help clarify guidelines for the use of private information and to develop a National
Information Infrastructure (NII), President Clinton established The Privacy Work Group of the Information
Infrastructure (IITF) Task Force (Computer Privacy Digest, 1995). The IITF has focused its attention on
three general sets of principles: General principles for all NII participants, Principles for users of Personal
Information, and Principles of individuals who provide personal information. The focus of this paper is to
further examine techniques which can be applied by providers of personal information. The IITF guidelines
for this group of NII participants is directed toward (1) why the information is being collected, (2) what the
information is expected to be used for, (3) what steps will be taken to protect its confidentiality, integrity,
and quality, (4) the consequences of providing or withholding information, and (5) the rights of redress.
(Computer Privacy Digest, 1995).
Our concern is with the third issue, what steps will be taken to protect its confidentiality, integrity, and
quality. We focus our attention on a specific statistical database system approach, Fixed Data Perturbation.
While this approach has been examined previously (Beck, 1980; Denning, 1980; Liew et al., 1985; Adam
and Wortman, 1989; Adams and Jones, 1989; Muralidhar and Batra, 1995; Muralidhar et al., 1995), the
present study provides an overview and extends previous research by including a bivariate analysis of
perturbed data sets.

Background
In 1986, Mason noted that there are a number of precautions which must be taken in the building of
intellectual capital. He specifically considered four ethical issues which producers of information must
concern themselves with: (1) Privacy, or what information about one's self or one's associations must a
person reveal to others, under what conditions and with what safeguards?, (2) Accuracy, or who is
responsible for the authenticity, fidelity, and accuracy of information?, (3) Property, or who owns the
information?, and (4) Accessibility, or what information does a person or organization have a right or a
privilege to obtain, under what conditions, and with what safeguards? These issues, and the problems
associated with them, remain of paramount importance to the Information Systems (IS) Manager, and their
resolve has taken on an increased sense of urgency given the increased expansion, usage, and availability of
corporate databases and the corresponding increases in database abuse (Wong, 1985; Straub, 1990;
Muralidhar et al., 1995). The basic consensus is that an organization is charged with providing accurate
data and information which is securely maintained but accessible to authorized users (Wysocki and Young,
1990; Laudon and Laudon, 1991; Schultheis and Sumner, 1995).
Attainment of this objective has proved difficult since it involves opposing goals. Information which is
accessible in its original form is not secure; implementing security measures requires either limiting access
or restricting data sets, thereby reducing the accuracy of the information generated from it, or both. As

Denning et al. (1979) have previously pointed out, "the requirement of complete secrecy of confidential
information is not consistent with the requirement of producing exact statistical measures for arbitrary
subsets of the population. At least one of these requirements must be relaxed" (pg. 92).
Fortunately, most queries made by users for decision making purposes generally do not involve specific
observations (e.g., an individual's salary), but rather are directed toward the attainment of summary
information (e.g., the average salary for a particular subset). In response a number of Statistical Database
Systems (SDBS) have been suggested. These include The Conceptual Approach (Ozsoyoglu and Chin,
1982), in which the user is allowed access to only a subset of the database based upon predefined attributes,
Query Restriction (Fellegi, 1972; Dobkin et al., 1979; Denning et al., 1979), whereby the user is allowed
unrestricted access by programmatic controls are placed on data restriction which hinder compromise,
Output Perturbation (Achugbue and Chin, 1979; Denning, 1980; Beck, 1980) which allows queries to
made directly to the actual database, but programmatically perturbs all outcomes prior to disclosure, and
Data Perturbation (Traub et al., 1984; Reiss, 1984) which presents the user with a dataset which has
previously been perturbed in a manner so as to retain the same basic characteristics but make individual
observations meaningless.
In a series of studies (Muralidhar et al. 1995; Muralidhar and Batra, 1995) contrasted the major SDBS
approaches and concluded that the Data Perturbation Approach, particularly the Fixed Data Perturbation
(FDP) approach, appears to offer some distinct advantages over the other methods. While it does have
some disadvantages, most notably that it requires additional disk storage and that concurrency with the
original dataset must be monitored and changed accordingly, it nonetheless (1) provides maximum
disclosure against exact disclosure since individual observations have been altered, (2) allows maximum
accessibility since users are given complete access to the full database, (3) does not require complex
algorithms or programmatically elaborate instructions which must remain online to perturb the results, and
(4) the actual data instance values cannot be derived through multiple queries.

Fixed Data Perturbation
By definition, perturbing a data observation means altering its value. Ideally, subjecting an existing data
series to a perturbation approach should result in a disguised series which maintains the same
characteristics of the original series, but which does not allow partial or exact disclosure of the original data
occurrences. Statistical or summary queries made of the perturbed dataset should yield outcomes which, if
not identical, should not be significantly different from those which would be obtained from the original
dataset. Conversely, queries intended to reveal or implicate unique entity occurrences should prove
fruitless. However, there is a distinct tradeoff between 'correctness' or accuracy of results obtained to
statistical queries and the 'incompromisability' or security of the perturbed data series in safeguarding
against queries which could divulge individual values.
There are a number of factors which affect the tradeoff between accuracy and security, and a number of
measures which have been suggested for each. The accuracy of results obtained from queries on a
perturbed data series are a function of how closely the perturbed dataseries maintains the characteristics of
the original dataseries. However, since each value within a perturbed dataset has been altered, it is
unreasonable to assume that there will not be some differences between the two series. At issue, then, is
what attributes should be considered as representative, how perturbation affects them, and how they can be
measured.
When provided perturbed data for statistical analysis, the primary concern is that the perturbed data series
follow the same population distribution as the original series. However, the resultant form of the perturbed
distribution, is a function of the original distribution form and the perturbation method applied. In some
cases, the resultant distribution is known, can be derived, or can be shown empirically (see Muralidhar and
Batra, 1995).

In the additive approach, yi = xi + ei where yi is the ith observation of the perturbed series, xi is the ith
observation of the original series, and ei is a random variable with =0 and prespecified variance (2e). Since
E(e)=0, the expected mean of the original and the perturbed series are identical. For the multiplicative case,
yi = xi * ei where ei is a random variable with mean of one (1) and a prespecified variance. Again, since
E(e)=1, the mean of the original series and the perturbed series are identical. In both approaches, since 2e >
0, the variance of the perturbed dataseries will be greater than that of the original dataseries.
If the original distribution can be maintained, regardless of method applied, the primary consideration
remains how accurate the outcomes of the queries made upon the database are, from a reporting
perspective, and how difficult it is to uncover the 'true' value of individual data observations, from a
security perspective.
In practice, the proximity of outcomes from a perturbed dataset to those from the original series is
dependent upon the analysis procedure applied. A number of measures have typically been used to this end,
including the differences between the original series and the perturbed series in terms of the mean,
variance, percentile values, and product moment and rank order correlations. Muralidhar and Batra (1995)
also suggest using the Mean Absolute Perturbation (MAP), noting that it provides a direct measure of
difference between the perturbed and original series whereas the standard deviation does not allow
comparison across distributions.

Methodology
Previous research focused on univariate perturbation of a dataseries, and subsequently examined the
security and accuracy provided by the perturbed series. While univariate statistical analysis does take place,
it is more likely that such analyses are bivariate or multivariate in nature. It is our assumption that most
queries made of databases consider the relationship between two or more variables than merely obtaining
descriptive statistics about single series. Take for example an analysis of salaries. While the researcher
would undoubtedly be concerned with overall mean salaries and variance, it seems likely that most of
queries made would be about the relationship between salary, years experience, age, level of education, and
other causal or mediating factors.
For the sake of illustration, assume that there are two dataseries, x and y, which are normally distributed.
The Covariance matrix and correlation for the original series would be:
x2 Cov(x,y)
Cov(x,y) y2
Cov(x,y)
and r =
x2 y2
If the two series are additively, and independently, perturbed by random variables ex ˜ N(0, ex) and ey ˜ N(0,
ey), the correlation matrix and correlation between the resultant series, x1 and y1, would be:
x2 + ex2 Cov(x,y)
Cov(x,y) y2 + ey2
Cov(x,y)

and r =
(x2 + ex2)( y2 + ey2)
Since E(ex)=E(ey)=0, and x and y are independent of ex and ey, the covariance will remain the same (see
Neter, Wasserman and Kutner, 1983). However, since the variances of the perturbed series are increased by
2
2
ex and ey , respectively, the correlation will be decreased accordingly. For example, assume that two
dataseries are both normally distributed with =0 and 2=1, and the covariance and correlation between the
original series is 1.0 and 0.8, respectively. If each series is perturbed by e˜ N(0,1), the covariance between
the perturbed series would remain at 1.0, but the correlation would be 1/2 that for the original series
(r=0.4), since the variance is twice that of the original series.
It is possible to generate random variables from a bivariate normal distribution (see Scheuer and Stoller,
1962; Lehman, 1977), maintaining the correlation (r) between the two series. In the simplest case, if
2 2
x=y=0.0 and x= y=1, then the y value corresponding to x is obtained as a function of x, a second standard
normal value (e˜N(0, e2)), and the desired r between them y = rx + e(1-r2). In the more general case, if the
means and standard deviations are x ,y, x , y and the correlation is r, then the relationships are x = xx + x and y
= y (rx + e(1 - r2)) + y
Some of the impacts of this technique are known, or can be derived. Tendick and Matloff (1994) have
recently shown how a random number perturbation method which partially solves the bias problem for the
multivariate normal case. They have further investigated nonparametric approaches to the problem
(Tendick, 1988). However, as they note, given the number of distributions available (e.g., normal, lognormal, uniform, gamma) and the number of measures of accuracy and bias (e.g., , , MAP, percentile
estimates), many of the outcomes must be examined empirically.
We have conducted a number of Monte-Carlo simulations to analyze and illustrate the use of bivariate
perturbation for statistical database explication. Given the page limitation for this proceedings, we cannot
fully present our initial findings at this time
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